This paper studies long-and short-term capital gains distributions around the time of the Tax Reform Act of 1997, which lowered the maximum tax rate on long-term gains. Using a panel of mutual fund data, I find that fund managers appear to tilt their distributions towards the long-term after 1997. This behavior is consistent with the hypothesis that managers are tax-sensitive, and the estimates are robust to the inclusion of fund-level fixed effects and other controls. I also examine fund capital gains patterns in a difference-in-differences framework, comparing actively managed to index funds, to find a lower-bound estimate of funds' response.
INTRODUCTION
O ver the last few years, there has been a growing popular interest in tax-managed mutual funds. Managers of these funds explicitly consider the tax consequences of portfolio management and attempt to increase after-tax returns, at least in part by manipulating their capital gain distributions. These tax-managed funds, however, are relative newcomers to the mutual fund industry and account for only a tiny fraction of the fund universe. On the other hand, the tax costs associated with mutual fund capital gain distributions predate the emergence of tax-managed funds, and have created a wedge between pre-and after-tax returns for many years. An interesting question, therefore, is whether standard mutual funds-those that do not explicitly take taxes into consideration-also respond to the tax system. In particular, do mutual fund managers change their behavior in response to changes in the tax laws, even when their funds' prospectuses do not explicitly mention tax minimization as a fund objective?
The Tax Reform Act of 1997 (TRA97) provides a good context in which to examine this question. After TRA97 took effect, the maximum tax rate on long-term capital gains fell sharply, widening the spread between short-and long-term capital gains tax rates. Since mutual fund managers have the ability to manipulate the short-to long-term gains distribution ratio by adjusting the holding period of securities sold within their portfolios, TRA97 is a good natural experiment. If fund managers wanted to minimize the individual tax burden of distributions, they could have shifted the holding pe-riods of securities in response to the Act. Thus, by examining the pattern of longand short-term capital gains around the time of the law change, any systematic changes in fund distribution patterns that may exist will emerge. To control for any other differential changes in the pattern of long-and short-term gains over the same period, I also use a difference-indifferences technique to compare the patterns of gains at index and actively managed mutual funds over the period. This helps to pin down the component of the changing pattern of gains that is likely to be attributable to the tax law.
There is evidence that both mutual fund managers and shareholders became increasingly conscious of the tax issues associated with fund investments throughout the 1990s, and fund companies-already responsible for reporting long-and short-term gains-were clearly aware of the law change in 1997. Both the popular and academic literature has indicated that investors are sensitive to after-tax returns, and that investment dollars flow to the funds with the best, persistent after-tax performance ratings. Fund investment advisors are generally paid with a percentage of assets under management, so as net assets flow into funds, compensation will rise. In light of these factors, it seems natural to predict that managers would change their behavior in reaction to TRA97, taking advantage of the favorable treatment of long-term gains to boost after-tax returns.
On the other hand, while at first glance managers' incentives seem clear-cut, further examination uncovers some qualifications that may limit the size of their response to the tax reform. For example, clientele issues may affect managers' incentives: if their marginal shareholders are tax-free investors-such as non-profit groups or retirement accounts-funds may not have any desire to respond to the new tax system. In addition, at the time of TRA97, legislation passed removing restrictions that previously had limited the amount mutual funds could earn from the sale or disposition of securities held less than three months; this made it easier for managers to generate short-term gains at the same time that TRA97 made longterm gains more attractive to taxable investors. Consequently, the natural experiment studied in this paper attempts to answer two questions: first, did managers respond at all to this change in longand short-term tax rates? And, if so, can we measure the average effect of this response on the pattern of funds' capital gains distributions?
Looking at a large sample of equity funds over the period spanning 1993 to 1999, it appears that the answer to the first question is affirmative: fund managers have substantially increased the percentage of distributions paid out as long-term over this time period, and there is a sharp break in the pattern of distributions in 1997, the time of the law change. When the sample is weighted by fund net asset size, the relative tilt toward long-term gains is still apparent, and these results are robust to the addition of covariates. To pin down the portion of the change attributable to TRA97, I compare the behavior of two groups of funds-index funds, unable to strongly respond to the law, and actively managed funds-before and after the Act. This difference-in-differences strategy removes other trends that may have affected the industry throughout the sample period, and enables me to answer the second question: I find that a shift from shortto long-term gains of approximately 5 percentage points is a reasonable lowerbound estimate of the average effect of the response. From this figure, it is possible to calculate a rough estimate of the annual reduction in capital gains taxes collected as a result of the shift from short-to longterm distributions at mutual funds: I estimate that tax revenue declined by over $280 million in 1998 due to the change in manager behavior.
If managers are manipulating their capital gains distribution patterns in response to changes in the tax law, this may have some interesting implications. The mutual fund industry is large, with $6,846 billion dollars under management in 1999, and there are large and growing numbers of mutual fund shareholders in the United States. According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI, 2000) , in 1999 47.4 percent of U.S. households-48.4 million households-held assets invested in mutual funds, up from 5.7 percent of households in 1980. While half of these mutual fund owners hold shares primarily inside qualified retirement plans, 54 percent of fund owners have purchased shares outside of employer-sponsored qualified plans. In 1998, Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Surette (2000) report that 16.5 percent of all U.S. households hold funds outside money markets or any retirement accounts, and these shareholders will be directly affected by the tax-burden associated with holding these funds. If managers are improving their after-tax returns, this may have a substantial, positive financial effect on large numbers of Americans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: a description of the legal environment that surrounds the objectives and rules guiding mutual funds is given in the next section, and is followed by a detailed account of the capital gains tax structure before and after TRA97. The fourth section describes the data used in this paper, as well as the econometric methodology. Next, the key results from an examination of the data are provided; as mentioned above, all of the results indicate that equity fund managers did tilt their capital gains distributions toward the long-term after 1997. Finally, a rough estimate of the revenue effects of the changing manager behavior is described, followed by conclusions and suggestions for topics of further research.
OBJECTIVES OF MUTUAL FUNDS
Mutual fund asset managers are responsible for buying and selling the securities held within a particular fund. Their goal is to maximize the return on these securities, subject to the constraints of the investment guidelines set out for them in the fund prospectus. These guidelines determine which types of securities a fund can hold (e.g., stocks, bonds, commercial paper), the ratio of different types of securities within a fund, and the risk level associated with these securities. The prospectus also lists the broad investment objectives of the fund.
While each fund has one set of objectives and guidelines for its investment advisors to follow, fund shareholders are made up of a broad assortment of individuals and institutions-people of a wide variety of income levels hold funds, face different marginal tax rates, and have different investment time horizons. Approximately one-third of households that own mutual funds have purchased shares outside of qualified retirement plans; these shareholders will face at least some taxable consequences from their investments. While the mean household has nearly $200,000 in financial assets (excluding home equity), the median is substantially lower: there is considerable diversity in the income, wealth, and thus the marginal tax rates of share-holding households (all figures from ICI, 2000) .
This diversity of ownership implies that, while the before-tax return may be the same, after-tax returns will vary widely across fund holders. Retirement account owners, for example, pay no taxes on either dividend and capital gain distributions or realized gains as long as the assets stay inside the shelter of the retirement account: taxes are only paid on gains as the investor reaches retirement and withdraws from the account. Very-lowincome individuals may have effective marginal tax rates of zero on their invest-ment income, while high-bracket earners pay as much as 40 percent. Finally, some institutional investors (such as non-profit organizations) may not pay tax at all on the returns from their mutual fund assets.
For individual investors-those with funds in taxable accounts and incomes high enough to pay taxes-the tax burden on mutual funds can be considerable. (See, for example, Dickson and Shoven (1995) , who calculate that pre-and post-tax returns for mutual funds can vary significantly.) Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) also find significant heterogeneity across the after-tax returns of different types of investor, and point to evidence that at least some investors have become increasingly aware of these tax costs. Bergstresser and Poterba go on to show that net fund investment inflows respond to these aftertax performance measures: they find that a 100 basis point increase in tax burden leads to a 4 to 8 percent drop in subsequent fund inflows. Finally, the rising popularity of tax-managed funds-although they are still a tiny percentage of the funds available-provides more evidence that shareholders are increasingly aware of the advantages of explicit taxmanagement of a fund's portfolio.
If fund managers are compensated based on a percentage of net assets under management-the typical arrangement in the mutual fund industry-and if concentrating on after-tax returns raises inflows into the fund, then it makes sense for managers to alter their behavior in order to improve after-tax returns. By manipulating turnover, using accounting methods, and deciding when to sell securities, managers can fairly easily change their pattern of capital gains distributions, and thus can improve the tax-efficiency of their funds. In a 1994 working paper, for example, Dickson and Shoven build their own mutual fund portfolio corresponding to the S&P 500 index; the authors are able to replicate the pre-tax performance of the index, but improve the annual af-ter-tax returns by over 50 basis points by harvesting losses and using a HIFO (highest cost in, first out) accounting strategy. In addition, new evidence from detailed portfolio holdings data indicates that managers care about taxes when making asset allocation decisions: Huddart and Narayanan (2002) find that managers are more likely to sell a larger amount of a stock if the sale would trigger a loss rather than a similarly-sized gain for the fund.
On the other hand, prior to the time of TRA97, fund managers had been constrained in the amount of very short-term securities they could hold within their portfolios. The short-short rule, designed to protect investors from excessive trading, revoked the tax pass-through status of investment companies if over 30 percent of a fund's gross income came from securities held less than 90 days, subjecting their earnings to corporate taxation. This severe penalty effectively kept managers from concentrating their portfolios in very-short-term assets, and thus may have dampened their short-term gains distributions. If managers were constrained by the 30 percent limitation, the elimination of this rule in 1997 would have allowed them to increase their short-term gains payouts. Therefore, the repeal of the short-short legislation may offset any tilt towards long-term gains made by taxsensitive managers.
TAX LAW CHANGES
Investment companies are required to distribute all accrued capital gains directly to shareholders. This is one of the ways they maintain their "pass-through" tax status; since the time of the Revenue Act of 1936, funds have only been taxed on earnings that they retain and thus avoid double taxation of income. When managers sell securities at a gain, they record the holding period of the asset in order to determine if it is a short-or long-term gain. Inside the portfolio, they can offset capital losses against gains, but any net gains must be distributed to shareholders within the year and be labeled shortor long-term.
TRA97 changed the U.S. capital gains tax rates, and increased the wedge between the tax rates on short-and longterm gains. Prior to the act, long-term capital gains income was capped at a maximum rate of 28 percent. For mutual funds, short-term capital gains income is not distinguished from other ordinary dividend income for the purposes of tax reporting, so short-term gains distributions are taxed at the ordinary income rate. In 1993, at the beginning of the sample period used here, the Revenue Reconciliation Act raised marginal income tax rates, establishing three marginal tax brackets over 28 percent (31, 36, and 39.6 percent) , increasing the relative attractiveness of long-term capital gains income.
In 1997, there were no changes in the ordinary income tax brackets-39.6 percent remained the top bracket, and continued to apply to households with more than $280,000 of income in 1999 dollars. The maximum rate on long-term capital gains, however, fell to 20 percent, while shortterm gains distributions remained taxed at the ordinary income rate (as noted above, this could be as high as 39.6 percent). Also, in this legislation, long-term gains weren't just favored for taxpayers in higher income brackets-the maximum tax rate on longterm gains for those in the 15 percent bracket was lowered to 10 percent.
The capital gains provisions of TRA97 took effect mid-year. Prior to May 7, 1997, any asset sold was subject to the old rules regardless of the holding period, and was taxed as ordinary income subject to a maximum rate of 28 percent. After May 6, 1997, all asset sales were affected by the new rules. This implies that sales made by pass-through entities-like mutual funds-before May 7, 1997 were not covered by the new legislation, even if these entities distributed the capital gains to their shareholders after the May 7 th date. In addition to changing the rates on capital gains, TRA97 also changed the required holding periods for short-and long-term gains, creating a "mid-term" gains category for assets held between 12 to 18 months; in 1998, the government repealed part of this last provision of TRA97, getting rid of mid-term gains. 1 The major change in the tax treatment of short-and long-term capital gains in 1997 provides a good opportunity to observe if mutual fund managers adjust their behavior in response to taxes. Managers have a large amount of control over the timing and accounting of sales of securities within their portfolio, and thus clearly have the ability to manipulate the holding period that determines if a gain will be classified as short-or long-term. TRA97 gives managers a perceptible incentive to tilt this margin, pushing gains into the long-term holding period.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In order to see if the tax law changes in 1997 affected the pattern of distributions at mutual funds, detailed fund-level data -including complete distribution information-is needed. Here, data from 1 Prior to July 29, 1997, any asset sold after a holding period of 12 months generated a long-term gain or loss.
From July 29, 1997, however, in order to categorize an asset as long-term, the asset must have been held for 18 months. Assets held 12 months or less remained classified as short-term, and were taxed as ordinary income. Assets held over 18 months faced the new, 20 percent maximum rate. Assets held between 12 and 18 months fell into a new "mid-term" gains category. These mid-term gains were taxed as ordinary income, but were subject to the old maximum capital gains rate of 28 percent. In July of 1998, Congress eliminated the midterm gains category retroactive to January 1, 1998-after this date, any asset sold after a 12 month holding period was considered long term. However, investors could not have been certain that the mid-term gains category would be repealed until mid-1998, and thus may have made investment decisions under the assumption that securities would need to be held for 18 months to receive the 20 percent rate.
Morningstar, Inc. is used to analyze the annual pattern of capital gains for 6,945 different funds. Morningstar is an independent provider of mutual fund, stock, and variable insurance product information, and is not affiliated with any mutual fund company. This data set has been merged together from seven years of annual Morningstar reports using the algorithm developed in Bergstresser & Poterba (2002) ; however, my sample includes a number of bond and mixed-asset funds not used in the Bergstresser and Poterba analysis. 2 The data span the years 1993-1999, forming an unbalanced panel. The data is not a random sample; rather, Morningstar attempts to report on the universe of mutual funds. They are not completely successful at this task, however: comparing the net assets in my sample with those reported by the ICI leads me to estimate that I have captured approximately 75 percent of the industry's assets. The panel includes all of the largest, retail equity funds, but the missing assets should be kept in mind when interpreting the results that follow. Morningstar reports a wide variety of fund level variables, including fund size (total assets in the fund), net asset value (NAV, or share price), etc., and has also provided detailed breakdowns of all dividend, short-term capital gain, and long-term capital gain distributions. I have restricted the sample to observations that contain this detailed capital gain information, leaving 25,361 observations. Several of the basic fund characteristics are summarized in Table 1 .
While the means of the variables and number of observations in the different categories included in Table1 vary from
year to year, there are no large outliers or surprising results. On average, the mean total assets of funds have been increasing over the period, as has the median market capitalization of the funds. Total capital gains distributions rise when market returns are up, but there is no such effect on the mean amount of dividends paid out. Table 1 also breaks the funds into ten broad investment objectives, and the percentage of funds in each category stays similar across the years of the sample. Unless specified, the results presented below include only the equity fund categories. 3 Since the goal of this paper is to see if the change in the tax law-in particular the change in the treatment of long-and short-term gains-led to a change in the pattern of distributions made by mutual funds, a variable that captures the pattern of long-and short-term gains was needed. While all the observations in this sample have positive total capital gains distributions, not all observations include both positive short-and long-term capital gains. Since any variable that places either short-or long-term gains in the denominator becomes problematic in light of these zero-value observations, I use the ratio of long-term to total capital gains distributions to capture the changing pattern of long-and short-term gains. This ratio, called LTTOT here for convenience, serves as the primary dependent variable in the majority of the regressions described below.
Another advantage of using LTTOT as a dependent variable is that it has an obvious interpretation: it will take on only values between zero and one, and can be thought of as the percentage of the total capital gains distribution paid out classified as long-term. The bounded nature of the ratio also prevents very large or small total distributions from driving the results; this characteristic is quite useful in the context of this paper. Here, there is a clear prediction about the relative appeal of short-and long-term gains as a result of TRA97: long-term gains become unambiguously more attractive to individual income taxpayers. However, there is no such clear prediction about the overall size of the total capital gain distribution in response to the tax law change, since taxsensitive investors always prefer to minimize their total capital gains distributions. Note that from July through December of 1997, it was possible to incur mid-term capital gains by selling assets with a 12-18 month holding period (see footnote one for details). Unfortunately, Morningstar was not able to provide any detailed midterm gains distribution information for mutual funds; instead, they combined mid-term gains with long-term gains for the 1997 distributions. 4 While mid-term gains were taxed at a higher rate than long-term gains (28 percent), they still received favorable tax treatment relative to short-term gains. On the other hand, midterm gains did not experience a change in tax treatment in 1997-before TRA97, assets sold after a 12-18 month holding period also faced a maximum 28 percent tax rate. 5 Thus, the inclusion of this mid-term gains rate may weaken the effectiveness of the LTTOT ratio as a measure of fund managers' shifts towards long-term gains: if managers are increasing their holding period from less-than-12 to 12-to-18 months, this cannot be attributed to TRA97 in the 1997 data because there is no change in the marginal rates before and after the Act for this holding period range. On the other hand, if investors are shifting holding periods into the greater-than-18-month range (true long-term gains), it may imply that their tax sensitivity was strong enough to induce them to hold securities over 18 months to receive the favorable rate. Unfortunately, given the data limitations, it is not possible to disentangle these two explanations.
In addition to creating the LTTOT ratio to use as a dependent variable, I have created some independent variables used in the regressions below. Year dummies have been constructed; in general, the 1993 dummy is the one dropped from the regression in any of the results listed below that include the full set of year dummies. Other specifications include a variable called AFTER. This is simply a dummy variable set equal to one if the observation belongs to the years 1997, 1998, or 1999, after the tax change took place.
In some specifications, the dependent variable is regressed on a constructed independent variable equal to the difference in the short-and long-term capital gains tax rates. Before TRA97, this difference was small-long-term gains were taxed at a maximum rate of 28 percent, and couples earning approximately $40,000-$100,000 in 1999 dollars faced this same rate on their ordinary income and shortterm gains. Starting in May 1997, the maximum long-term gains rate was 20 percent, but the short-term rate was equal to the ordinary income tax rate, and thus depended on the income level of the individual taxpayer. For the purpose of constructing this independent variable, I have used the marginal tax rate of 31 percent as the effective short-term gains rate.
While 31 percent is the marginal rate for the mean mutual fund shareholder 's household and is the rate used for the marginal mutual fund dollar in Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) based on their analysis of the Survey of Consumer Finances (and is also a more conservative approach than using the top marginal rate), the choice of short-term tax rate does not matter for the analysis presented below. All of the economic content of this independent variable comes from the change in the difference between the short-and long-term rates, and the same break in the pattern occurs in 1997 for all marginal tax brackets. The choice of specific rate merely scales the coefficients.
The goal of the OLS econometric approach employed here is to document and measure any increase in fund's long-term to total gains ratios after the passage of TRA97, controlling for any other factors that may have affected LTTOT ratios during this period. To accomplish this, all of the regressions discussed here include fund-level fixed effects. This should help to remove any variation in the long-term to total capital gains ratio that may be due to fund-specific objectives, portfolio composition, and manager style. The tickersymbol of the fund, a unique fund identifier, is used to control for the fixed effects. In addition, all the regression results presented have robust standard errors, which allow for any arbitrary autocorrelation process across years in fund observations. 6 These fixed-effects should go a long way towards ridding the regressions of any fund-level tastes for long-or short-term gains.
The basic hypothesized relationship between the long-term to total gains ratio and the time effect of the tax-law change can be written as:
where i represents each fund observation, t represents the year, AFTER captures the year effects (i.e., will be equal to one if the year of the observation is after the TRA97 change), and α i captures the fund-specific component of the LTTOT ratio. Simply put, the model used here assumes that the LTTOT ratio of each fund is a function of the year in which the observation is made, fund-specific fixed effects, covariates (the X it 's), and an error term. In some cases, the regression is weighted by fund net assets; while the un-weighted specifications capture the behavior of the average fund, the asset-weighted regressions measure the effect of TRA97 on the LTTOT ratio of the average dollar invested in the industry.
Results from regressions of the form shown in equation [1] are presented below. If correctly specified, these equations will capture the economic relationship between the ratio of long-term to total capital gains distributions and the timing of the implementation of TRA97-if managers respond to the Act by tilting their gains towards the long-term, β, the coefficient on AFTER, will be positive and significant. Despite the inclusion of fundlevel fixed effects and other controls, however, it is still possible that there may be some omitted factor that caused managers to increase their LTTOT ratios after 1997 and that this factor is affecting the observed value of β.
To reduce this possibility, I have set up a number of additional OLS regressions in a difference-in-difference framework. These specifications compare the behavior of two groups of funds before and after TRA97-one group, actively managed funds, can fully respond to the changing tax law, and the other group, index funds, cannot fully adjust their capital gain distribution patterns. By comparing the LTTOT ratios of these groups pre-and post-1997, I will "difference out" any 6 To control for this potential autocorrelation, all standard errors are "clustered" in Stata by fund ticker symbol. trends that may have affected the industry over the sample period. As long as no trends differentially affected the two groups of funds, any divergence in the pattern of their LTTOT ratios can be attributed to the tax law effect. Formally, this relationship can be written:
where NON INDEX is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation belongs to the group assumed to be affected by the tax-law change (actively managed funds), and equal to zero if the group is not affected (index funds). In a standard difference-in-difference regression, an indicator variable for the affected, or treatment, group would also be included in the equation. Here, however, the fund-specific intercept captures the treatment effect: any fund that belongs to an affected group remains in that group throughout all years of the panel, so the α i term, in addition to controlling for other fund-specific characteristics, will stand-in for the treatment dummy. The coefficient of interest is λ, which represents the effect on the treated group after the law change. A number of the difference-in-differences regressions presented below are also weighted by net assets.
In both of the specifications described above, the X it 's represent a series of covariates that are included in many of the regressions presented below to test the robustness of β, the coefficient of interest. It is unlikely that TRA97 is the only determinate of the pattern of long-term to total gains distributed to shareholders. In fact, many other factors and fund characteristics may systematically influence LTTOT-both before and after the change in the tax law-even after controlling for fund level fixed-effects. I have tried to include a wide variety of these factors in the multivariate specifications in order to attempt to isolate the 1997 tax-law effect.
For example, fund and market return variables will plausibly have an effect on the LTTOT ratio. As fund returns rise, managers may decide to lock-in capital gainseither within the same year, raising shortterm gains, or over a longer horizon. In falling markets, lower fund returns may lead to net asset withdrawals, causing managers to realize long-term gains in order to meet redemption requests. Consequently, both annual fund returns and oneyear-lagged fund returns are included in the multivariate specifications. Twoyear-lagged returns are also used in a few specifications. In addition, overall market returns may have similar effects on fund distribution patterns, so annual and oneyear-lagged market returns are also used as covariates; the portfolio used to represent the market is a value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. 7 In a few specifications, quarterly and quarterly one-year-lagged market portfolio returns are included rather than annual returns. In other specifications, I include two-and three-year lagged market returns as well; this gives the analysis no additional explanatory power, leaving the coefficients of interest unchanged.
Additional factors may also influence fund long-term to total gains ratios. Loads, or sales charges, may be broadly associated with differential patterns of long-or short-term distributions, and may discourage shareholder withdrawals from a fund. If these sales charges diminish frequent trading in fund shares, they may limit the fund manager's need to liquidate securities to meet redemptions, and thus affect capital gains distributions. Although front loads (paid when purchasing fund shares) are effectively sunk costs and plausibly less of a discouragement than back, or redemption-triggered, loads, both may be tied to distribution patterns and are included as covariates. Fund dividend yields-defined as annual per share dividend income normalized by share price-are included as a control in some regressions as well; if a fund distributes more of its returns to shareholders through dividend payouts, it may have less need to pay short-term gains.
Median market capitalization of the portfolio is another possible covariate, one that will help to capture any systematic differences in the distributions of funds holding large rather than small companies. Similarly, the price/earnings, or P/ E, ratio is a measure of the growth or value tilt of the fund's portfolio. A value fund holds securities with low P/E ratios-in a rising market, when companies have escalating share prices, P/E ratios increase and cause value fund managers to sell securities and generate gains. Including P/E ratios in the specification may help control for this value-fund effect.
While portfolio turnover clearly affects the LTTOT ratio, changes in turnover may also be an outcome of the changing tax law. Consequently, turnover is endogenous, and is not included as an independent variable. Instead, I include a variable that indicates whether or not the fund has a new manager of less than two years: new managers may be prone to reorganizing a fund's portfolio as they take over the helm, and thus may generate different patterns of turnover when they come to a fund. Another factor that will impact both turnover and distributions is net cash flows into a fund. If managers are pressed for cash to meet redemptions, they may be forced to change their pattern of liquidations to meet these demands. Since this data set does not contain detailed cash flow information, I follow Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) and create a measure of inflows defined as:
where ASSETS represent the total net assets in the fund at the end of year t, NAV is the fund's net asset value, DIVS are the fund's per share annual dividend distributions, and GAINS are the fund's total per share annual capital gains distributions. I also run the specifications using Bergstresser and Poterba's two other inflow measures,
which assumes reinvestment of dividends and gains, and
which controls for the fact that assets flow into the fund throughout the year, with RETURN measured as a fund's total return in year t. All three measures take on similar values, and do not affect the coefficients of interest in the regressions presented below. Consequently, the first measure, INFLOWS 1 , is shown in the following results. I also include measures of fund total net assets and lagged net assets in all multivariate regressions.
In case fund age affects fund distribution patterns, I include dummies for young funds (with age less than or equal to 5 years) and old funds (over 10 years) in the specifications-the omitted dummy is equal to one for funds between 5 and 10 years old. Using a continuous variable for fund age leads to similar results. I also use fund capital gain overhang as a covariate in some regressions; overhang measures the amount of unrealized gains (as a percentage of assets exposed to gains) held inside a portfolio, and thus captures a fund's ability to generate capital gains distributions. Finally, I include a variable that represents the ratio of total capital gains distributions to fund NAV or share pricethis can be thought of as the percentage of each share paid out in gains (a fund that liquidated all its securities would have a ratio equal to one). If funds with large amounts of distributions are consistently favoring short-term gains, perhaps because of a taste for high, frequent turnover, the coefficient on this variable will be negative.
RESULTS
A first look at how the percentage of capital gains distributed as long-term (LTTOT) has been evolving shows that, although the ratio varies from year to year, there is a distinct break in the pattern at the time of the TRA97. As soon as the tax law change took effect, LTTOT rose significantly; as shown in the following subsections, this increase appears robust to a number of specifications and controls.
Actively Managed Equity Funds
The first sets of results are listed in Table  2 ; these show the basic pre-and post-TRA97 comparisons of the long-term to *significant at 10% level **significant at 5% level ***tests if the average of the coefficients of the 94/95/96 year dummies is equal to the average of the coefficients on the 97/98/99 dummies. total capital gains ratio, without the difference-in-differences comparisons. The sample here consists of all actively managed equity funds in the database, including domestic stock, foreign stock, and sector funds. 8 Columns one, two, and three of Table 2 compare the average fund's long-term to total gains ratio before and after the passage of TRA97. In all three specifications, controlling for fund level fixed effects, the average LTTOT ratio rises after the implementation of the Act; this pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that equity fund managers were responsive to the changing tax law. For example, in column one, the coefficient on AFTER is 0.112, and is very significant, falling well within the 99 percent confidence interval. Column two re-runs the specification, using the difference in short-and long-term tax rates as the independent variable-the economic significance of the two specifications is the same, but the coefficient is scaled down to 0.014 in this second case.
The specification in column three is slightly different, containing a full set of year dummies in addition to the fixed effects, and takes a closer look at how the distribution pattern evolves over time. The margin of interest in this specification is the difference between the LTTOT ratio before and after the 1997 law change. To see if the coefficients on the year dummies are generally higher after the tax law change, therefore, I take the average of the "before" coefficients (94, 95, 96) and the average of the "after" years (97, 98, 99), and perform an F-test to see if this average is the same in both periods. As can be seen at the bottom of column three, the F-statistic here is quite large, and there is an effectively zero probability that the average coefficient does not change after 1997.
The remaining columns of Table 2 repeat the specifications of the first three columns, but weight the sample by fund net asset size. Consequently, the coefficients in these columns can be interpreted as a comparison of the LTTOT ratio of an average dollar invested in actively managed equity funds before and after the change in tax law. In all cases, these coefficients are quite similar to the unweighted coefficients-column four shows, for example, that the average dollar invested in an equity fund had an 11 percentage point increase in its long-term to total gains ratio after TRA97.
This preliminary evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that active equity fund managers did adjust their distribution patterns in response to a changing tax environment. The significant, positive direction of this effect also implies that, while the repeal of the short-short rule may have raised short-term gains distributions, the move to long-term gains dominates any increase in short-term gains. While these results are suggestive, they do not completely rule out the fact that LTTOT may be changing for other reasons besides the introduction of TRA97. One way to pin down the portion of the change in LTTOT ratio attributable to the Act is to turn next to the differencein-differences framework, differencing out the changes in capital gains due to non-TRA 97 related factors and leaving only the tax-related component of the effect; this strategy is applied below. In ad-dition, adding covariates to the basic specifications may capture any trends in capital gains patterns not controlled for by the fund-level fixed effects; this strategy is also carried out to test the robustness of the TRA97 effect.
Equity Index Funds
Although there are no funds in the data that were completely isolated from the tax law changes, it is reasonable to suppose that some categories of funds were differentially affected by TRA97. Thus, it may be possible to tease out the causal effect of the tax law change by finding such a subset of funds and comparing the effect of TRA97 across the groups.
The first group of funds to compare to the actively managed results is the set of indexed funds. 9 Indexed funds are designed to track a market index such as the S&P 500, and the composition and relative proportions of the securities in the their portfolio must correspond as closely as possible to the index to ensure that the fund return will match the index return. Managers of index funds, therefore, do not have much flexibility when it comes to adjusting their portfolios. Dickson and Shoven (1994) , describing their attempts to improve the tax-performance of an index-type fund, point out that tax-management strategies will be much easier for actively managed funds to pursue, since they will have more flexibility in realizing loss positions, less worry about wash sale restrictions, 10 and may be able to take advantage of tax strategies using derivatives. Over the sample period, both indexed and actively managed funds also had substantial net inflows (see Table 1 ), and thus both types of funds were likely to have newly purchased securities to sell to generate short-term gains and were unlikely to be forced to liquidate positions to meet redemption requests. Consequently, as in the total sample of funds, neither long-nor short-term capital gain distributions from index funds should have been driven by fund outflows.
Based on these factors, the response of index funds to TRA97 provides an interesting comparison to the behavior of the actively managed funds discussed above: while index fund managers faced the same law change as other fund managers and may have had the same desire to change the pattern of long-term to total gains, these managers were hindered in their ability to do so by the constraints inherent in managing an indexed fund. Index funds are not a perfect control group, however, since their managers may respond to the changing tax environment, and have some small opportunities to affect the margin of long-vs. short-term gains. For example, Dickson and Shoven (1994) were able to make substantial improvements in the tax-performance of an index-type fund with accounting strategies alone. Nevertheless, an index fund manager's ability to tilt gains toward the long-term should still be substantially less than that of an active fund manager, and index funds' behavior should provide a distinct contrast to that of actively managed funds. Note that, as in any difference-in-differences estimation, an underlying identifying assumption is that no trends differentially affected the two comparison groups over the period of the 9 While tax-managed funds would also provide an interesting contrast, there are just too few in the sample to be able to draw any conclusions from their behavior. 10 IRS wash sale restrictions prevent an investor from declaring a loss on the sale of a security if the security is repurchased within 30 days of its sale. Since index funds must hold stocks in specific proportions, selling to generate losses forces the fund to deviate from the index for this 30-day period, and thus may not be an option for the manager. Actively managed funds, on the other hand, can sell losers without this worry, and have the option to purchase securities similar to the one sold if they wish to keep the risk composition, etc., of their portfolio the same.
sample. Neither an examination of the characteristics listed in Table 1 nor other descriptions of the fund industry point to any such differential trend in the patterns of capital gains distributions for actively managed and index funds over the period, but the identifying assumption should be kept in mind when interpreting the results presented below. As a preliminary step, I run the specifications from Table 2 on a sample of index funds alone; as expected, these results (not presented here) give a coefficient on AF-TER of 0.052 in the un-weighted regression, half the size of the actively managed sample, with a standard error of 0.028. In the asset-weighted regressions on the index fund sample, the coefficient on AFTER is not distinguishable from zero. These smaller, weaker effects support the hypothesis that actively managed equity funds were more able to respond to the changing tax environment than index funds. The small, positive results from the indexed sample may be indicative of another, timerelated effect-in addition to TRA97-that influenced the long-and short-term gains patterns for mutual funds, or may be evidence that index fund managers are partially able to manipulate the holding periods of their distributions. In either case, looking at the differential effect between the index and actively managed samples should provide a lower bound estimate of the fraction of the changing LTTOT ratio attributable to TRA97.
The first two columns of Table 3 set up the comparison between equity index and actively managed funds in a differencein-differences framework. The coefficient of interest in these specifications is on the interaction term, AFTER times NONINDEX. Column one presents the results from a fixed effects regression with AFTER and the interaction term as the dependent variables-here, the coefficient on the interaction term is equal to 0.06, and is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. The next column, two, re-peats the specification, but uses a full set of year dummies instead of AFTER to control for time. Again, the coefficient is significant, and is slightly larger (0.066). This implies that, on average, actively managed equity funds increased the fraction of their distributions paid out as longterm by 6 percentage points more than index funds after the passage of TRA97.
The next two columns of the table, three and four, weight the specifications by net assets. Again, the coefficient on the interaction term is the one of interest, and in both regressions this coefficient is larger than its un-weighted counterpart: according to column three, for example, the average dollar invested in an actively managed equity fund had a LTTOT ratio 10 percentage points higher than a dollar invested in an index fund, after the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Note that, in the weighted specifications, there is no pure time effect once the interaction term is included-the coefficient on AFTER is effectively zero, and the average of the year dummies is not significantly different before and after 1997. Thus, for the average dollar invested in a stock fund, all the post-TRA97 increase in the longterm to total gains ratio is attributable to the behavior of actively managed funds.
These results imply that managers of index funds appear to have been significantly less influenced by TRA97 than their active-manager counterparts. In addition, although index fund advisors may not have been 100 percent unaffected by the law change, any behavioral change they may have undergone is likely to move in the same direction as the non-index fund managers: both types of fund managers had an incentive to increase their LTTOT ratios, but index fund managers were constrained in their ability to achieve this goal; this means that the difference-in-difference estimates should give a lower bound on the true effect of the tax law change on non-index funds. Comparing the change between the index and non-index groups shows that actively managed funds increased their LTTOT ratio by approximately 6 percentage points relative to index funds. If index funds changed their behavior as well, then the true effect of the tax law may have been even larger.
Equity Institutional Funds
While index fund managers are the best choice of control group in the sample, I also contrast the behavior of institutional and retail fund managers. Institutional funds are run like standard mutual funds, and are often managed by the same asset management companies as an investment company's retail (non-institutional) funds, but the purchase of these funds is restricted in some manner; generally, institutions like trusts, non-profits, and corporations invest in the funds. Individual investors with large portfolios-portfolios worth hundreds of thousands of dollarsmay also be allowed to invest in institutional funds, in order to take advantage one two three four five six seven eight   TABLE 3  EFFECT OF TRA97 ON THE RATIO OF LONG-TERM TO TOTAL GAINS, ACTIVELY MANAGED/INDEX  AND INSTITUTIONAL/RETAIL FUND LTTOT it = a i + TIME i *b + X it *d + (TREATMENT*TIME) it *c + e it , run on the sample of actively managed/index or retail/ institutional funds, including fixed effects. The sample covers the period 1993-1999. All standard errors are robust, and have been clustered on fund ticker symbol (a unique fund identifier). **significant at 5% level *significant at 10% level ***tests if the average of the coefficients of the 94/95/96 year dummies is equal to the average of the coefficients on the 97/98/99 dummies.
of the lower fees and expense ratios frequently given to institutions.
Consequently, the shareholders of institutional funds are systematically different from those holding retail funds, face different tax rates and regulations, and were differentially affected by the passage of TRA97. In spite of these investor differences, however, there is no clear prediction about the way institutional fund managers should have responded to the changing tax law. Some institutional clients, such as qualified retirement plans and corporations, were unaffected by the new legislation. In these cases, the institutional fund managers had no incentive to change their distribution patterns. On the other hand, very wealthy individual investors were significantly affected by TRA97, and institutional funds managing their assets had strong incentives to take advantage of the increasingly favorable treatment of long-term gains for these clients. Despite this ambiguity, it is still worth exploring the effect of the tax reform on institutional funds, both to see if their response to the Act differs from their non-institutional counterparts, as well as to gain evidence about which classes of shareholders most strongly influence the distribution choices of these funds' managers.
When the sample is broken into separate retail and institutional categories, both types of funds appear to have increased their LTTOT ratios after 1997. Difference-in-differences specifications comparing retail and institutional funds are presented in the second half of Table 3 : here, the coefficients on the interactions terms are negative. Non-institutional funds had a slightly lower increase in the LTTOT ratio than institutional funds, although there is still a significant time effect for both institutional and retail funds. The final columns of Table 3 , seven and eight, weight the difference-in-difference specifications by net assets. In these regressions, the coefficients on the interac-tion terms are positive but statistically indistinguishable from zero-the LTTOT ratio of the average dollar invested in an institutional mutual fund is not discernible from a retail dollar, though both groups saw an increase in their long-term to total gains ratios after the Act.
In the comparison of retail and institutional funds, it appears that the "treatment" group of retail funds experienced a similar or even slightly smaller effect on their LTTOT ratios at the time of the Act than the control. This response is not inconsistent with our initial predictions about the behavior of these funds, and indicates that institutional managers may be quite sensitive to the incentives of their wealthy individual and non-qualified trust investors, which were unquestionably affected by TRA97. Any explanation of institutional behavior, however, remains speculative. All that we can unambiguously take from this data is that institutional funds, like the rest of the fund universe, appear to have significantly increased the percentage of total capital gains paid out as long-term after TRA97.
Addition of Covariates
Since fund fixed effects are already included in all the results shown above, any fund-level preferences for long-or shortterm gains are already captured in the base specifications. However, to test the robustness of the results presented in Tables 2 and 3, I run several regressions including a number of other independent variables to see if there are additional systematic factors that may change the coefficients of interest. These variables are described above in the fourth section.
The results of the multivariate specifications are presented in Table 4 . Columns one and two show the coefficients on AFTER for actively managed equity funds including various covariates-the size of the time effect diminishes in these multivariate results, but remains significant at INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: one two three four five six seven eight nine All speficifications include fund net assets and 1-year-lagged net assets as covariates; the coefficients on these variables are effectively zero (measured to three decimal places). All standard errors are robust, and have been clustered on fund ticker symbol (a unique fund identifier). *significant at 10% level **significant at 5% level the 5 percent level. As expected, fund and market returns are quite important in the determination of the LTTOT ratio, but accounting for these factors does not make the time variation around the implementation of TRA97 disappear. Using quarterly rather than annual market return data in the specifications does not noticeably affect the coefficient on AFTER. The third column weights the sample by net assets and includes all possible covariates; again, it looks like the average dollar invested in an actively managed equity fund saw an increase in its LTTOT ratio after 1997. To further test the robustness of the time effect, I re-ran these same specifications including an additional time trend variable. These results, not presented here, do not substantially differ from the results in Table 4 : including a time trend does not dampen the size or significance of the coefficients of interest in any of the multivariate specifications. The next three columns of the table include the interaction term NONINDEX* AFTER. The coefficients on the interaction term are quite similar to those presented in Table 3 : after the passage of the Act, the average actively managed equity fund increased its LTTOT ratio by 5 to 7 percentage points relative to the average index fund, and these results are statistically significant. Column six indicates that the average dollar in an actively managed fund had an even larger relative increase in LTTOT ratio, increasing almost 12 percentage points after TRA97 compared to an index fund. Again, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that active equity fund managers responded to the change in tax law-relative to index fund managers-by tilting their gains ratio towards the long-term. While this result hinges on the identifying assumption of no differential trends across index and actively managed funds, it does appear robust to the inclusion of fund fixed effects, time controls, and a number of other covariates.
Finally, the last three columns of the table show the difference-in-difference results using institutional funds as a comparison. In these specifications, the coefficients on AFTER remain positive, but there is no distinction between the behavior of the institutional and retail fund classes in either the un-weighted or asset-weighted regressions. These results are consistent with the findings in Table  3 , and imply that the distribution behavior of institutional funds may not be distinguishable from that of retail funds.
In general, these specifications continue to support the hypothesis that TRA97 was linked to an increase in the ratio of longterm to total capital gains distributions, and that the effect was stronger for actively-managed equity funds. The lowerbound estimate of this effect from the difference-in-difference results remains close to the earlier findings, with a value of approximately 0.06. While many other factors do appear to significantly affect LTTOT ratios, including additional independent variables does not appear to absorb the time effect corresponding to the change in tax law.
All of these results come from a sample of all equity funds, including both foreign and domestic stocks. I also examined the behavior of each of these classes of funds alone, running the above specifications on foreign and domestic stocks separately (these results are presented in Table 5 ). For foreign stock funds, the LTTOT ratio appears to be consistently higher after 1997, but this effect is only weakly significant. It is not possible to compare foreign actively managed and index funds: the sample size is not large enough, since there are only a handful of foreign index funds in the data. Domestic stock funds, on the other hand, have large and significant increases in their LTTOT ratios after TRA97: the un-weighted difference-indifference specifications show a 7 percentage point increase in LTTOT ratios for actively managed funds after the Act, rela- .075** (.037) -.029 (.020) -.020 (.023) -.008* (.005) yes yes 8,709
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: one two three four five six seven eight nine ten eleven twelve tive to index funds, and, for the assetweighted regressions, this measure rises to 14 percentage points. As a final experiment, I examine the pattern of long-term to total gains distributions for bond funds alone. 11 For these funds, there is no consistent increase in LTTOT ratio after the passage of the Act; instead, the coefficient on AFTER varies in sign, magnitude, and significance depending on the specification (see Table 5 for details). Again, as with the foreign equity funds, it is not possible to run a differencein-differences comparison for bond funds-the control group becomes too small. Thus, in contrast to equity funds, bond funds had no clear response to the change in tax law. This outcome may be understandable, however-bond funds pay much smaller amounts of total capital gains distributions than stock funds, and consequently may have much less of a margin in which to adjust their patterns of distributions. Also, the behavior of the bond fund managers may be driven in part by their clienteles. Bond funds pay out substantial dividend income, which is taxed at the same rate as short-term capital gains income. Bond fund investors are already receiving a substantial portion of their fund returns in the form of these highly-taxed dividends, so bond fund managers may not have had much incentive to adjust the duration of their capital gains payouts. Perhaps also, for these managers, the repeal of the short-short rule dominated any capital gains tax rate effects.
REVENUE EFFECTS
The results presented above indicate that the long-term to total capital gain distribution ratio tilted after the passage of TRA97. To put this behavioral change into perspective, it is helpful to relate the marginal shift in distribution patterns to the overall amount of capital gains paid out, and, consequently, to U.S. tax revenue collected on such distributions. Unfortunately, the data here do not provide an unambiguous way to tease out these costs, but some quick back-of-the-envelope calculations give a sense of the magnitude of the change. Looking at the results from several difference-in-difference specifications allows me to construct a conservative estimate of the effect of the tax law change: these specifications show that the ratio of long-term to total capital gains rose by approximately 0.06 once the Act was implemented. Based on this coefficient, and again using an estimated marginal tax rate of 31 percent for shortterm gains, the average tax rates paid by individuals on capital gains distributions with and without a behavioral response to the law change can be roughly estimated.
In 1998, for example, approximately 10 percent of the total capital gains distributed in this sample were paid out as shortterm, and the other 90 percent paid as long-term. If, without fund manager response to TRA97, the percentage of short term distributions would have been 6 percentage points higher, the tax rate on longterm gains equal to 20 percent, and the tax rate on short-term gains equal to 31 percent, then the actual average tax rate paid on capital gains was 3 percent less compared to a world without a behavioral reaction by fund managers to TRA97. 12 Although in 1998 45.3 percent of fund assets were held in institutional accounts and some fraction of the remaining individual accounts held retirement assets (ICI, 2001) , the total amounts of capital gains distributions paid out in a given year to taxable shareholders are still quite substantial. In the Morningstar data, total capital gains distributions paid out equaled $170.7 billion in 1998-if only one-quarter of these distributions were held in individual, taxable accounts, and if the average tax rate on capital gains distributions fell by approximately 3 percent based on the assumptions listed above, this corresponds to a government revenue loss-or personal tax savings-of $282,000,000.
While this revenue loss figure is based on a great number of assumptions, estimations, and extrapolated information, it does help to give a sense of the importance of the question posed here: if mutual fund managers are responsive to taxlaw changes, then fund capital gain distributions as well as capital gains generated from assets held outside funds may move substantially in response to tax legislation. And, since such a vast and increasing amount of U.S. financial wealth is held inside fund accounts, these law changes may have large revenue effects via the mutual fund sector that should be incorporated into the policy-making process.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Reform Act of 1997 made longterm capital gains substantially more attractive than short-term gains to individual income taxpayers. Mutual fund managers with taxable shareholders had an incentive to respond to these changing rates, but also faced clientele and regulatory factors-like the short-short rulethat may have dampened these incentives. Using Morningstar panel data, this paper attempts to pin down managers' reaction to the law.
The evidence shows that, in general, equity fund managers did appear to alter their behavior in response to the law change. The percentage of capital gains distributions paid out as long-term significantly rose after the law took effect, and controlling for fund fixed effects and a wide variety of other fund characteristics does not weaken this result. Using a difference-in-differences comparison of index and actively managed funds helps to rule out any other factors that may have affected the industry's capital gains patterns over the period. These comparisons reveal that actively managed funds significantly increased the percentage of distributions paid out as long-term after the tax reform relative to index funds; if index funds were also able to manipulate their distribution patterns to some small extent, this puts a lower bound of 0.06 on the increase in the ratio of long-term to total distributions after the law change. Weighting the sample by fund net asset size does not diminish the effect; in fact, in some specifications, the results become stronger. The results are particularly evident and robust for domestic stock funds, but do not hold for funds investing in a wide variety of bonds and fixed-income instruments. All of this evidence comes together to help answer some of the questions raised by this topic: fund managers appear to be influenced by taxes in their decision-making process.
There are still many interesting questions raised by this experiment left unanswered, however, such as the failure of institutional funds to exhibit a pattern of behavior distinct from that of retail funds. Since the response of institutional funds to the tax-law changes is not distinguishable from other funds, it appears that institutional fund managers may be as taxsensitive as retail managers at least at this margin. This result is not intuitive-the common perception is that most institutional investors are not subject to indi-vidual income tax rates, and thus were not expected to respond to the TRA97 tax rate change. The fact that institutional funds appeared to increase their LTTOT ratios after the Act may imply that a sub-section of institutional funds (such as those belonging to wealthy private investors) do face and respond to individual tax rates, or that some other, omitted factor may be causing the institutional funds to increase the fraction of gains paid out as long-term post-1997. If the latter is true, it may raise additional questions about the behavior of retail funds as well. Either way, further research into this class of funds may shed some light on the entire industry's response to TRA97. It is also important to note that the inclusion of the 1997 midterm gains distributions as long-term gains weakens the interpretation of the results. For the first year following the Act, some of the relative increase in long-term gains may have been due to individuals shifting from the short-term into the midterm gains category, which cannot be attributed to the tax reform. Again, more detailed fund distribution data may help to answer this question.
One final question that still needs to be answered is how managers are manipulating the holding periods on their distributions. In this data set, the only method managers may be using to affect gains distributions that is observed is portfolio turnover-other, accounting-level information is not available. However, turnover also occurs for a wide variety of other reasons besides manipulating capital gains distributions; in fact, Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) find that turnover is not typically directed at tax-minimization. To see if there is a shift in the pattern of turnover around the time of TRA97, I run a regression of AFTER on turnover for a sample of equity funds. While the coefficient on AFTER is uniformly negative across specifications-consistent with the hypothesis that managers are decreasing turnover to tilt gains towards the longterm-the size and significance of the effect is quite varied, appearing sensitive to the regression specification. Thus, while managers may be changing turnover in order to manipulate capital gains distributions, turnover appears to move for too many other reasons to be able to tease out the effect of the tax change here.
